{"id":700,"date":"2026-05-29T17:11:39","date_gmt":"2026-05-29T17:11:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/?p=700"},"modified":"2026-07-29T17:12:55","modified_gmt":"2026-07-29T17:12:55","slug":"may-market-insights-mastery-and-the-terror-premium-how-epic-fury-can-deliver-a-peace-dividend","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/2026\/05\/29\/may-market-insights-mastery-and-the-terror-premium-how-epic-fury-can-deliver-a-peace-dividend\/","title":{"rendered":"MAY MARKET INSIGHTS | MASTERY AND THE TERROR PREMIUM: HOW EPIC FURY CAN DELIVER A PEACE DIVIDEND"},"content":{"rendered":"

Mastery of energy, again<\/span><\/strong><\/h2>\n

Winston Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty,
\ntied Britain\u2019s fate to Persian oil. United States
\nPresident Donald Trump\u2019s war in Iran, centred
\non Operation Epic Fury, could do the same for
\nthe West by removing Iran\u2019s nuclear shadow,
\nresetting oil toward US$60, and finally unlocking
\na modern peace dividend.<\/p>\n

\u201cMastery itself was the prize of the venture.\u201d Winston <\/span><\/em>
\nChurchill\u2019s 1912\u201313 case for converting the Royal Navy <\/span><\/em>
\nfrom coal to oil\u2014enshrined in historian Daniel Yergin\u2019s <\/span><\/em>
\nThe Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power\u2014captured<\/span><\/em>
\nthe brutal clarity of a great power energy strategy: accept <\/em><\/span>
\ndependence to command the seas. That wager framed <\/em><\/span>
\nthe last century. In 2026, as Epic Fury grinds through the <\/em><\/span>
\nGulf and Brent trades above US$100, the question is no <\/em><\/span>
\nlonger whether oil confers mastery, but who holds it: a <\/em><\/span>
\nrevolutionary theocracy astride the Strait of Hormuz, or <\/em><\/span>
\na West intent on stripping the terror and nuclear risk now <\/em><\/span>
\npriced into every barrel out of the energy system\u2014finally <\/em><\/span>
\ncollecting a long\u2011deferred peace dividend.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

“Mastery itself was the prize of the venture.”- Daniel Yergin, on Winston Churchill\u2019s 1913 argument\u00a0<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Churchill\u2019s shift bound Britain\u2019s prosperity to distant wells
\nand narrow waterways, welding energy supply to national
\nsurvival. He understood that control of energy was not
\nan adjunct to power, it was the metric. In April 2026, with
\nHormuz contested and Iranian missiles demonstrating
\nreach beyond the Middle East, the same dilemma
\nconfronts policymakers and markets. Does the West still
\nwant that prize, and what is it prepared to stake to reclaim
\nit from a regime that has spent half a century turning oil,
\nterror, and nuclear brinkmanship into interchangeable
\ntools of coercion? Assume Trump\u2019s campaign does what it
\nis now on course to do: not merely reopen a chokepoint,
\nbut neutralize a nascent tactical nuclear threat which, left
\nintact, would hardwire a doomsday premium into global
\nenergy prices for a generation.
\nIran\u2019s war with the West has done what decades of
\nshocks, embargoes, and \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d could not:
\nit has made the hidden tax on energy legible even on a
\nBloomberg screen. Strip out the terror and nuclear\u2011risk
\npremiums in a post\u2011Trump\u2011Iran settlement, and Brent
\ndoes not belong north of US$100; it sits much closer to
\nthe US$60 level implied by underlying supply and demand
\nand pre\u2011war bank research. The gap between where oil
\ntrades in a world held hostage by a nuclear\u2011ambitious
\ntheocracy at Hormuz and where it would trade if
\nflows were secure and de\u2011weaponized is more than a
\nvolatility surface. It is the unclaimed peace dividend of
\nglobalization, the energy market analogue of the windfall
\nthat followed the end of the Cold War, when the removal
\nof an existential nuclear standoff released capital,
\nconfidence, and capacity back into the real economy.
\nThe choice now facing the West is whether to lock in
\nthat outcome. Ending the Cold War removed the Sword
\nof Damocles that had hung over every investment
\ndecision for half a century; a successful conclusion to
\nIran\u2019s nuclear extortion would do something similar for
\nthe 21st\u2011century economy, collapsing a structural risk
\npremium that has quietly taxed households, corporates,
\nand sovereigns alike. The question, as Churchill would
\nhave recognized, is whether the West is prepared not
\njust to win on the battlefield but to consolidate that
\nvictory into a new era of energy mastery, and to treat
\nthe potential verified removal of Iran\u2019s enriched stockpile
\nand fuel\u2011cycle capabilities as a security gain on the scale
\nof the 1987 Intermediate\u2011Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or
\nthe dissolution of the Soviet arsenal.
\nFor Europe, the stakes are not abstract. Iranian missiles
\nand drones have already shown that European Union
\nterritory and NATO logistics hubs sit uncomfortably
\nclose to the new strike envelope, shattering the illusion.<\/p>\n

that Gulf risk could be quarantined to energy prices
\nalone. The deeper reckoning is with Europe\u2019s own energy
\nstrategy. The choice by many Western governments
\nto anchor industrial policy primarily on climate
\ntargets\u2014while neglecting cheap and secure supply\u2014is
\nnow coming home to roost. Prosperity in an artificial
\nintelligence (AI)\u2011driven economy rests on abundant,
\nreliable energy rather than on cheap consumer imports,
\nechoing Churchill\u2019s insight that mastery of energy is
\nmastery of power. That logic points north as well as east:
\nCanada\u2014with its hydrocarbons, hydropower, and critical
\nminerals\u2014looks less like a peripheral supplier and more
\nlike a potential resource superpower if it can cut through
\nregulatory thickets and build the infrastructure to deliver
\nsecure barrels, electrons, and metals to allied markets.
\nU.S. hard power, the security backstop European,
\nCanadian, and the United Kingdom economies long
\ntreated as a law of nature, now looks more contingent,
\nmore politically conditional, and more thinly spread
\nacross theatres. One could easily imagine Washington
\nreverting to a post\u2011First World War stance, turning inward
\nto rebuild its real economy, and no longer willing or able
\nto offer security as a global public good. A successful
\nTrump\u2011led settlement that removes both the nuclear
\noverhang and the Hormuz chokepoint as instruments of
\ncoercion would not only stabilize Atlantic world energy
\nsupply but also underwrite a more credible NATO
\ndeterrent at lower long\u2011run cost\u2014replacing the ersatz
\n\u201cpeace dividend\u201d of underfunded defence with a genuine
\none built on reduced threat rather than wishful budgeting.
\nFor investors, a decisive outcome in Iran would not
\njust redraw maps in the Gulf; it would refashion term
\npremia. As the nuclear and terror discounts bleed out
\nof the curve, gilt yields and U.S. Treasuries alike would
\nbegin to reflect lower expected inflation and slimmer
\nrisk premia rather than recurring energy shocks. Credit
\nspreads\u2014particularly for energy\u2011intensive sectors
\nand fragile sovereigns\u2014would compress as balance
\nof payments and default risks ease. Equity markets
\nwould reprice in turn: structurally lower input costs
\nand a thinner geopolitical risk layer would lift margins
\nin manufacturing, transport, and consumer names,
\neven as oil majors and defence stocks surrender some
\nof their crisis rent. For the Square Mile and Wall Street,
\nthe real prize is not another trade on US$120 Brent; it is
\nthe re\u2011rating that comes when a structural doomsday
\npremium is finally taken out of the system and the peace
\ndividend\u2014deferred since the end of the Cold War and
\nrepeatedly eroded by Iran\u2014at last starts to be paid in
\ncash flows rather than communiqu\u00e9s.<\/p>\n

Churchill\u2019s ghost at Hormuz<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the first day of April 2026, as Brent traded just
\nabove US$100, the world was relearning what Churchill
\nmeant when he called mastery the prize. As first lord
\nof the Admiralty, he forced the Royal Navy off domestic
\ncoal and onto Persian oil, then secured that lifeblood
\nby buying control of Anglo\u2011Persian Oil. He knew the
\nbargain: oil conferred speed and reach, but at the price
\nof dependence on distant fields and fragile sea lanes.
\nHence his warning to Parliament in 1913 that \u201con no one
\nquality, on no one process, on no one country, on no
\none route, and on no one field must we be dependent\u201d
\nand his insistence that safety and certainty in oil lay
\n\u201cin variety, and in variety alone.\u201d
\nThat decision created the modern energy system and
\nplaced Iran at its centre. Four decades later, as prime
\nminister, Churchill confronted the second act of his
\nown gamble when Iran\u2019s prime minister Mohammad
\nMossadegh nationalized Anglo\u2011Iranian Oil Company\u2019s
\nassets. The 1953 coup that restored the Shah was less a
\nmorality play than a confirmation that control over Iranian
\noil would be contested by empires, nationalists, and,
\neventually, revolutionaries. Churchill\u2019s instinct to secure
\nsupply at the source and to dominate the sea lanes that
\nconnected it to Britain established a strategic architecture
\nwith a simple premise: mastery of energy flows was
\nindistinguishable from mastery of global power.
\nThe twist came in 1979, when that architecture was
\nseized by those it had previously constrained. The
\nIranian Revolution toppled the Shah and installed
\nAyatollah Khomeini\u2019s theocracy\u2014a regime that viewed
\nthe U.S. as the \u201cGreat Satan,\u201d embraced terrorism as
\nstatecraft, and sat astride the Strait of Hormuz. Oil
\nworkers struck, production collapsed, and prices more
\nthan doubled. The world discovered that the geographic
\nfulcrum Churchill had chosen could just as easily be
\npulled by a revolutionary fist. From that moment,
\nthe markets began to price an Iran terror premium.
\nIt was distinct from OPEC\u2019s cartel pricing power or
\nconventional war risk. It recognized that a state sponsor
\nof terrorism\u2014with a web of proxies and control over
\nthe narrow channel through which roughly a fifth of
\nseaborne oil must pass\u2014would periodically weaponize
\nthat position. Each tanker attack in the 1980s \u201cTanker
\nWar,\u201d each Hezbollah bombing, each missile launched at
\na Gulf facility added a sliver to that premium. Over time,
\nslivers hardened into a slab.<\/p>\n

Churchill\u2019s maxim was inverted. Variety still existed
\ngeologically, with new barrels from the North Sea,
\nAlaska, and deepwater, but strategically the system
\nwas again anchored on a single actor most willing to
\nturn energy into a cudgel. Where Churchill had sought
\nsafety through variety, the world lived with uncertainty
\nconcentrated in one revolutionary capital. And where
\nhe had seen mastery as the prize of bold, deliberate
\nventures, mastery of energy risk quietly migrated to a
\nregime that treated terror as an operating model.<\/p>\n

How terror became a line item<\/strong><\/p>\n

The terror premium is no longer an academic calculation;
\nit is a visible spread. In calmer phases of the cycle,
\ngeopolitical risk barely nudges price forecasts. In crisis, as
\nin early 2026, the gap between pre\u2011war expectations for
\noil and the levels seen when Hormuz is threatened yawns
\nwider, and futures curves kink as traders try to price the
\npossibility of disruption. Even if part of that is fear and
\ntemporality, the underlying message is obvious. There is
\na structural surcharge on every barrel to account for the
\nprobability that Tehran or one of its proxies will, at some
\npoint, take terrorist action.
\nThat surcharge has a history. The 1973\u201374 oil embargo
\nrevealed how quickly geopolitics could quadruple prices,
\nbut Iran was then still an ally. The true discontinuity came
\nwith the 1979 revolution and the Iran\u2011Iraq War. The Tanker
\nWar saw mines in the Gulf, neutral shipping attacked, and
\nU.S. naval forces drawn in to reflag and escort tankers.
\nWashington\u2019s 1984 decision to designate Iran a state
\nsponsor of terrorism, off the back of Hezbollah\u2019s bombing
\nof U.S. Marines in Beirut, made explicit what markets had
\nintuited: one of the central suppliers to the system was
\nalso its most committed saboteur.
\nIn the decades since, each escalation has ratcheted the
\npremium higher. Iran\u2019s nuclear program, its investment
\nin Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, its
\nattacks on Saudi infrastructure in 2019, its role in Hamas\u2019s
\nOct. 7, 2023 massacre, and its sponsorship of Houthi
\nstrikes on Red Sea shipping have all translated into higher
\nbase prices and fatter risk tails. Each diplomatic attempt
\nto park the problem\u2014most notably the 2015 nuclear
\ndeal\u2014shaved a little off temporarily but never eliminated
\nthe underlying risk. The slope of the long\u2011run price path
\nsteepened even when nominal prices fell.<\/p>\n

The February 2026 war crystallized what had previously
\nbeen an accounting identity. The U.S. and Israeli strikes
\non Iran\u2019s nuclear and military infrastructure triggered
\nTehran\u2019s maximalist response: mines laid in Hormuz,
\nanti\u2011ship missiles fired, and swarming attacks on
\ntankers. Overnight, a theoretical discount factor became
\na literal blockade. Brent jumped, futures curves bent out
\nof shape, and importers from Asia to Europe scrambled
\nfor alternative supplies. The terror premium stepped out
\nof the footnotes and onto the front page.
\nWhat is at stake in the Trump administration\u2019s Iran
\ncampaign, with Epic Fury at its core, is therefore not
\nsimply the fate of one regime or one waterway. It is
\nwhether this premium remains a permanent feature
\nof the global economy, an invisible tax set in Tehran,
\nor is finally stripped out by a deliberate act of policy.
\nIn Churchill\u2019s terms, it is whether mastery over energy
\nrisk belongs to those who built the system or to those
\nwho have learned to hijack it.<\/p>\n

Trump, Hormuz, and the end of the free ride<\/strong><\/p>\n

For half a century, the controlling Western thesis on
\nGulf security has been simple. The U.S. guarantees open
\nsea lanes in and around Hormuz, and everyone else
\nstructures their politics and budgets around that free
\ninsurance. Europe and the UK run down their militaries,
\nbuild their energy systems on Russian gas and Gulf crude,
\nand talk loftily about multilateral virtue. Asian powers,
\nabove all China, binge on imported hydrocarbons,
\nincluding discounted barrels from sanctioned regimes.
\nAll assume that American carrier groups will materialize
\noff the chokepoints when required.
\nTrump\u2019s antithesis is to withhold the automatic
\nguarantee at the moment of maximum stress. The U.S.
\ncan break Iran\u2019s remaining ability to contest Hormuz;
\nthat is not in doubt. The point is not that America lacks
\nthe power; it is that, for the first time in decades, it is
\nopenly questioning whether it should deploy that power
\nunconditionally. By allowing a closure or partial closure
\nto bite, Trump ensures that the immediate pain is felt
\nmost acutely in exactly those jurisdictions\u2014Europe and
\nChina\u2014that have benefited most from cheap energy
\nand U.S.\u2011policed routes while contributing least to the
\nunderlying security. His reported blunt message to European and British
\nleaders\u2014you need the oil out of the Strait more than
\nwe do, why not go and take it\u2014is not a gaffe. It is the
\nspoken form of a strategic pivot. It reverses the default
\nassumption that U.S. hard power is an inexhaustible
\nglobal public good to be drawn on by allies, adversaries,
\nand free riders alike. It forces allies to confront a
\ncontradiction they have long ignored: their ability to
\ndenounce American \u201cunilateralism\u201d and underfund their
\nown defences rests entirely on a U.S. security umbrella
\nthey neither fully finance nor politically respect.
\nIn Hegelian terms, the refusal to solve Hormuz on
\ncue is the necessary negative moment before a more
\nhonest order can emerge. A rapid, surgical clean\u2011up
\nwould restore the status quo ante: Europe resumes
\nunderinvesting in defence, China continues to arbitrage
\ndiscounted crude from rogue regimes, and the terror
\npremium remains a permanent feature of the price strip.
\nBy delaying, by insisting that those who need the barrels
\nmost step up, Trump is forcing responsibilities and
\nexposures into the open.
\nThe strategic prize is not merely the reopening of a
\nchokepoint. It is a reordered system in which the U.S.
\n\u2014no longer the unpaid global policeman\u2014becomes
\nthe central arbitrageur of hydrocarbons. U.S.\u2011aligned
\nproduction in the Americas, combined with a
\ndiscretionary capability to secure or decline to secure
\nHormuz and the Bab el\u2011Mandeb, places Washington
\nat the heart of the hydrocarbon chessboard. That is
\nChurchill\u2019s logic, updated: mastery of the flows, not
\nmerely participation in them.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

From Berlin to Epic Fury: two peace dividends<\/strong><\/p>\n

The template for how such a transition can work is
\nfound not in energy markets but in a concrete slab
\nof history: the fall of the Berlin Wall. When the Wall
\ncame down and the Soviet Union dissolved, markets
\ndid something brutally rational. They stripped out the
\n\u201cnuclear Armageddon premium\u201d embedded in every
\nyield curve, every defence multiple, every corporate
\ninvestment decision. The first peace dividend of 1989\u201391
\nwas not gauzy sentiment in Berlin squares; it was
\nfinance ministers and chief financial officers reallocating
\ncapital from tanks and missile silos to fibre\u2011optic cables,
\ncontainer ports, and early internet infrastructure.<\/p>\n

The end of the Cold War did not abolish risk. Local
\nwars continued, terrorism persisted, financial crises
\nerupted. But the one structural threat that had framed
\nevery strategic choice since 1945\u2014the possibility that
\na superpower miscalculation could end civilization
\nin half an hour\u2014was removed. Defence budgets fell
\nas a share of GDP, the U.S. briefly flirted with fiscal
\nbalance, and Europe ploughed its savings into welfare
\nstates and integration. Globalization took off, buoyed
\nby the combination of U.S.\u2011guaranteed security and
\ncapital released from the hard requirements of nuclear
\ncompetition.
\nTrump\u2019s Iran strategy is that logic applied to the world\u2019s
\nenergy arteries. The stated aim is not to manage Iran\u2019s
\nbehaviour at the margin, but to destroy the regime\u2019s
\ncapacity to hold Hormuz and the Bab el\u2011Mandeb
\nhostage\u2014to decapitate the terror command, pulverize
\nlayered naval and missile defences, and shred the
\nlogistics that knit together Tehran and its proxies. Done
\nproperly, it is not a punitive raid; it is a structural change.
\nSuccess in this campaign would be\u2014for oil and for
\nnuclear risk in the Middle East\u2014what the fall of the
\nWall was for superpower confrontation. Whereas
\n1989\u201391 allowed markets to stop discounting an
\nannual probability of superpower annihilation, a
\ngenuinely de\u2011weaponized Hormuz\u2014and an Iran that has
\nsurrendered enrichment and seen its buried stockpiles
\nremoved\u2014would finally allow traders and central banks
\nto stop discounting a chronic probability of terror\u2011driven
\nsupply shock and nuclear breakout. Just as the first
\npeace dividend financed the first internet age and a
\ndecade of globalization, this second, energy\u2011centred
\npeace dividend could finance an AI\u2011driven productivity
\nboom and the repair of Western balance sheets.
\nThe exact numbers will always be contestable.
\nForecasts for Brent before the war in 2026 clustered
\naround levels that implied a much calmer geopolitical
\nbackdrop. Today\u2019s prices\u2014inflated by mines in Hormuz
\nand missile salvos across the Gulf\u2014sit far higher. Bring
\nsupply security back closer to that earlier world, with
\nmore routes, more non\u2011OPEC barrels, and fewer armed
\nactors using sea lanes as leverage, and the path back
\ntoward a US$60\u2011type equilibrium is not utopian. It is the
\nlogical outcome of removing a chronic fear factor from
\nevery barrel. The first peace dividend took the nuclear
\nthreat off the table. The second would take the Iranian
\nRevolutionary Guard Corp\u2019s finger off the energy trigger
\nand its hand off the centrifuge switch.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

China\u2019s lost arbitrage, Europe\u2019s reckoning<\/strong><\/p>\n

Not every major power benefits from this shift. For
\ntwo decades, China has quietly exploited the gap
\nbetween Western scruples and Western guarantees.
\nIt has built a growth model that leans heavily on
\nimported hydrocarbons, often sourced at discount
\nfrom sanctioned or unstable producers such as Iran,
\nVenezuela, and Russia, and shipped through chokepoints
\npoliced by a navy it did not pay for. It enjoyed a double
\narbitrage: cheap barrels from rogue regimes and free
\nsecurity from the very order it denounced as hegemonic.
\nAn Iran outcome that genuinely breaks Tehran\u2019s capacity
\nto weaponize Hormuz and a political transition that
\nremoves Venezuela from the ranks of criminalized
\npetro\u2011states would shrink that arbitrage dramatically.
\nDiscounted barrels from rogue regimes become scarcer
\nand more conditional. Access to secure sea lanes
\nbecomes more explicitly linked to political behaviour.
\nBeijing still has options, from domestic coal to growing
\nrenewables and a formidable industrial base, but the era
\nof quietly pocketing a terror\u2011premium\u2011fattened discount
\nwhile someone else patrols the sea lanes is over.
\nEurope faces a different reckoning. It built its post\u2011Cold
\nWar model on three assumptions: cheap Russian gas,
\ncheap Gulf crude, and a permanent American security
\numbrella. All three have been shattered or strained.
\nThe invasion of Ukraine forced a painful divorce from
\nGazprom. The Hormuz crisis exposes the vulnerability
\nof European industry to disruptions in seaborne oil and
\nliquified natural gas (LNG). Trump\u2019s pointed suggestion
\nthat Europe should go and take the oil it needs confronts
\na political class that has confused soft power and climate
\nvirtue with strategy.
\nThis could be Europe\u2019s Churchillian moment\u2014a belated
\nrecognition that mastery, or even basic security, is never
\nfree. That would mean serious rearmament, investment
\nin naval and air capabilities, and hard choices on
\ndomestic energy production and infrastructure.
\nOr Europe can continue to moralize, hoping that
\nWashington quietly resumes its role as global policeman
\nwhile Europe itself resolves to be even more righteous.
\nIn that case, it will discover that the distribution of any
\nenergy peace dividend is not symmetrical. Those who
\npay for mastery tend to keep a larger share of the prize.<\/p>\n

The myth of decline, reversed<\/strong><\/p>\n

The myth of American decline has always been a story
\ntold by people who mistake a change in role for a loss
\nof power. The United States is not a spent force. It still
\ncommands roughly half of the world\u2019s usable military
\npower, hosts the core of the global innovation system,
\nand sits atop an unmatched resource base. What has
\nchanged is that it can no longer afford to be the world\u2019s
\nsecurity contractor, subsidizing allies and adversaries
\nalike, while also underwriting an ever\u2011expanding
\ndomestic state and pretending its debt is costless.
\nThe path now opening through Hormuz and Tehran
\nis the path back to alignment between commitments
\nand capabilities. Resolve the Iran crisis on terms that
\nsecure the free flow of oil, consolidate political change in
\nCaracas, strip out the terror premium, constrain China\u2019s
\naccess to cheap, weaponized variety, and stabilize a more
\nmoderate Iran within a peaceful regional order\u2014and
\n2026 will not join 1973 and 1979 as another grim entry in
\nthe chronicle of oil shocks. It will be remembered as the
\nyear the world finally honoured Churchill\u2019s insight that
\nsafety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and reclaimed the
\nmastery he knew was the real prize of the venture.
\nThe fall of the Berlin Wall closed the book on the nuclear
\nsuperpower confrontation and released a peace dividend
\nthat financed globalization and the first internet age.
\nSuccess in Trump\u2019s Iran gamble can close the book on
\nthe terror\u2011driven energy and nuclear order that began
\nin 1979 and release a second dividend: a US$60\u2011oil world
\nthat finances an AI\u2011driven productivity boom and a
\nrebuilding of Western power on safer foundations.
\nThe question is no longer whether that dividend exists
\nor whether mastery over energy and nuclear risk in the
\nGulf is up for grabs. It is whether, this time, the West has
\nthe will to take the prize.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Mastery of energy, again Winston Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty, tied Britain\u2019s fate to Persian oil. United States President Donald Trump\u2019s war in Iran, centred on Operation Epic Fury, could do the same for the West by removing Iran\u2019s nuclear shadow, resetting oil toward US$60, and finally unlocking a modern peace dividend. \u201cMastery […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":221,"featured_media":701,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_oasis_is_in_workflow":0,"_oasis_original":0,"_oasis_task_priority":"","_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-700","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-market-insights"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/700","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/221"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=700"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/700\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":703,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/700\/revisions\/703"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/701"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=700"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=700"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/advisor.wellington-altus.ca\/hendersonandwilliams\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=700"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}