June Market Insights: America at 250

Rebirth, not decline

“We have not chosen this time.” – Oswald Spengler

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The rebirth has begun

America reaches its 250th anniversary not as a fallen hegemon, but as the dominant centre of global hard power, monetary power, and frontier innovation. It still sits astride the world’s resource base through energy, agriculture, and continental depth; it still issues the reserve currency at the core of global trade and finance; and it still leads the race to build artificial intelligence (AI) as the next digital platform. Yet precisely because American power remains so large, the visible breakdown of the post–Second World War rules-based order has become impossible to ignore. To anyone who has read German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (1918), this is not a surprise but a pattern: history is not a straight line of progress. Instead, it is the record of civilizations that rise as living cultures harden into systems and eventually exhaust the moral energy that made them great in the first place. America did not choose this time, but it has been born into it.

That is the first key to understanding the present moment. Spengler’s core thesis in The Decline of the West is that the true subjects of history are not abstract eras or universal mankind but distinct civilizations, each with its own inner logic, life cycle, and eventual decline from culture into civilization. Great civilizations are not immortal, and their late phase is marked by empire, money, machines, mass politics, and the exhaustion of the moral energy that once gave those systems life. The postwar American order fits that description almost too neatly. Bretton Woods, NATO, the U.S. dollar standard, and the global sea lanes all worked for decades because they were backed by an overwhelming concentration of American industrial, financial, and military capacity. But late imperial orders do not fray only under debt and foreign pressure. They also decay when elites begin to treat populations as interchangeable economic units, and when unchecked immigration policies—however elegantly defended in market theory—collide with the cultural, civic, and institutional limits of national cohesion. The social fragmentation and political backlash that follow are not deviations from the Spenglerian script. They are textbook Spengler: universalist elites talking as if all limits are obsolete while the social basis of their order quietly cracks beneath them.

The more interesting question is why the United States, unlike so much of the West, still seems capable of adjusting to this new age faster than its rivals or even many of its allies. The answer lies not first in economics or strategy, but in national formation. America was not founded on blood, tribe, dynasty, or even territory in the old European sense. It was founded as a covenantal republic built around texts: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and an argument about liberty, dignity, and self-government that was always morally incomplete. From the Puritan settlers onward, this produced a distinctive rhetorical and political habit known as the American jeremiad: the practice of treating national failure not as proof that the country is a fraud, but as evidence that the people have betrayed a true promise and must return to it through reform and renewal. That habit is deeply embedded in the American DNA. It is why the U.S. has so often turned crisis into reconstruction instead of resignation. At its best, the country does not collapse when its myth fails; it reinterprets failure as a summons to rebirth.

Divergence in the West: Why America still adapts

That difference is what sets America apart from Europe and Britain in this late-civilizational moment. Much of Europe today looks exactly like the kind of tired civilization Spengler had in mind: rich, regulated, legalistic, morally performative, but strategically sluggish and increasingly unable to generate internal energy for self correction. Britain, having moved from empire to post-imperial managerialism and then into the unresolved aftershocks of Brexit, looks less like an adapting power than a historical memory struggling to locate a new governing myth. China is formidable in industry and scale, but it is also acutely exposed to imported energy, seaborne trade vulnerability, and the brittle political logic of a party-state that must always appear infallible. The U.S., by contrast, remains the one major Western power with both the material base and the civilizational mechanism to absorb shock and convert it into a new operating system. Much of the West, Canada included, still cannot decide whether it lives in a North American future or an Atlantic past. Prime Minister Mark Carney captures the confusion perfectly. He says, correctly, that the world must be accepted as it is and that nostalgia is not a strategy—yet he spends his public life seeking validation from the very institutions of old Europe and Pax Americana that the world is leaving behind. Socially he talks like an Atlanticist ideologue; economically he thinks like a hemispheric pragmatist. Canada’s ruling class wants the perks of a reborn American order while emotionally pining for a club that no longer runs the world. In the larger drama of American rebirth, that remains a secondary question, but an instructive one.

This is where British economist John Maynard Keynes enters the story as Spengler’s unlikely companion. Spengler described the metaphysics of decline. Keynes, at Bretton Woods, saw the mechanism that would eventually drive the American branch of that decline. He worried that a reserve-currency order centred on the dollar, without stronger means of disciplining structural imbalances, would allow the hegemon to consume beyond its productive means and force adjustment costs onto others unevenly. What began as an architecture of strength for a creditor and industrial giant would, over decades, tempt the U.S. into the privileges of deficit finance and financialization. The result would be a long shift from creditor to debtor, from workshop of the world to consumer of last resort, from industrial middle-class to a more polarized economy in which finance flourished while manufacturing thinned out. Spengler supplied the late-imperial diagnosis; Keynes quietly sketched the balance-sheet path that would get America there.

By the middle of the 2020s, the warning lights could no longer be ignored. U.S. debt had risen above US$38 trillion, and interest payments on the debt had exceeded defence spending—an extraordinary strategic marker for a superpower whose postwar role rested on the fusion of fiscal, military, and monetary dominance. For officials such as U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, this was the wake-up call: when debt service exceeds the military budget, the empire is no longer simply financing its power; it is financing the memory of its power. Interest becomes the tribute a late order pays to preserve habits it can no longer afford. In that sense, the debt itself became a national security issue. It signaled that the old model—borrow freely, police the world, allow imbalances to compound, and trust reserve-currency privilege to paper over the difference—was not indefinitely sustainable. The populist revolt that found its most visible expression in President Donald Trump is best understood against this long arc. Trump is not an accidental eruption. He is what happens when a Spenglerian late empire collides with the American jeremiad. On one level, he is a textbook late-civilizational figure: personalist, executive-centred, contemptuous of procedural pieties, and able to establish a direct emotional connection with a mass electorate alienated from institutions. That is the Caesarist side of the story. But Trump is also a distinctly American kind of prophet; rough, vulgar, often incoherent, yet still recognizably shaped by the jeremiad’s structure. His message is not that America was always a lie. It is that the postwar global order betrayed the republic: its workers, its factories, its borders, its wars, its cultural coherence, and its sense of self. “America First” is therefore not just a slogan. It is the political language of national repentance and return.

Hard power returns to fundamentals

That is also what makes Trump’s national-security strategy more important than many of his critics, or even some of his admirers, have understood. The strategy was not merely a list of threats or a break with liberal internationalist etiquette. It reflected a deeper reordering of priorities: economic security as national security, sovereignty over abstraction, energy and industrial capacity as strategic assets, and burden-sharing as a hard imperative rather than a diplomatic nicety. In that sense, Trump’s strategic instinct grasped something the old rules-based elite resisted, admitting that in a world where universal order is thinning out, hard power returns to fundamentals. Borders matter. Factories matter. Fuel matters. Food matters. Chokepoints matter. Supply chains matter. The nation that can secure these things for itself while still leading the next technological platform will hold the commanding position.

Nowhere is that reality more obvious than at the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s petroleum liquids consumption and about a quarter of seaborne oil trade transit that narrow channel, alongside substantial LNG flows vital to Europe and Asia. A contested Hormuz is not a regional inconvenience; it is a direct test of the physical underpinnings of the global system. This is why the scenario called “Operation Epic Fury” matters so much as narrative and as strategy. A crisis that closes or seriously disrupts the Strait would expose, in a flash, the strategic vulnerability of China, the United Kingdom, and Europe. China’s industrial engine remains deeply dependent on imported energy that must pass through vulnerable sea lanes. Europe and Britain, for all their tendency to look down on the U.S. as vulgar or unstable, still rely on energy and shipping systems that are ultimately secured by power they do not themselves possess in sufficient quantity. Their post-historical moral confidence rests on an American naval and monetary shield they often pretend to transcend.

In the old framework, the U.S. was supposed to underwrite this system indefinitely while presenting itself as merely the custodian of rules. In the new framework, exposed by Hormuz, the fiction disappears. The question becomes brutally direct: who has the resources, the military means, the industrial resilience, and the political will to sustain order when chokepoints close and markets panic? Europe can regulate. China can manufacture. But the Americas, and above all the U.S., possess the deeper substrate of power: food, hydrocarbons, freshwater, mineral depth, strategic geography, two great ocean buffers, and the technological ecosystems now building AI’s infrastructure.

That last point is crucial, because AI is often discussed as if it were a disembodied software miracle. It is not. AI is the next digital platform, but like every real platform it rests on concrete inputs: data centres, electricity, cooling, transmission, semiconductors, land, construction capacity, and secure supply chains. The glamour is in the model; the power is in the substrate. And the substrate is increasingly resource intensive. The countries best positioned for the AI age will not just be the ones with good coders or large user bases. They will be the ones that can feed giant compute systems with reliable electricity, secure critical materials, protect physical infrastructure, and sustain industrial buildout without strategic blackmail from abroad. On that score, the Americas hold the decisive edge. Resource security is the true hard power of the coming era, and the U.S. sits at the centre of it.

In every real crisis, the world does not flee the U.S. dollar system; it begs for deeper access to it. During Operation Epic Fury, as tankers stopped and energy markets convulsed, finance ministers and central bankers from every major bloc quietly asked the same question they had in 2008 and 2020: can we get into the U.S. Federal Reserve’s swap-line club? The scramble for dollar liquidity in the middle of a hard-power shock made one thing unmistakable. King Dollar is not dead; it is alive and well, and it is about to sit behind a new global digital platform. The same country that controls the reserve currency everyone runs to in extremis is now building and hosting the AI infrastructure, data centres, and digital-asset rails that will define Bretton Woods 2.0. That is not the end of American monetary hegemony. It is its mutation into a deeper, more technological form.

The rebirth trade is underway

For investors, this is not mainly about politics. It is about regime change. The U.S. is adjusting first to a world where hard power means energy, resources, manufacturing, critical supply chains, monetary credibility, and technological leadership. That is bullish for North American commodities, power, capital goods, industrial infrastructure, and strategic manufacturing. The U.S. had to deal with its debt, had to become a manufacturer again, and had to bring critical supply chains home. That adjustment is now underway. This is why the market backdrop is bigger than a tactical rally. It is the start of a secular bull market rooted in reindustrialization, capital expenditure, and productivity. AI is not just another software theme. It is a platform shift and an arms race. That means the first-order winners are power, chips, data centres, networking, automation, logistics, and the industrial systems needed to sustain them. Hardware before software, electrons before applications.

The macro regime is changing too. The age of easy Keynesianism is ending because the U.S. can no longer afford to backstop the global economy for free while letting debt compound and productive capacity erode.

The answer is not austerity but growth, specifically supply-side growth driven by investment, productivity, and domestic capacity. If that is the path, then what investors are seeing is not the last gasp of U.S. exceptionalism. It is the beginning of a new one. This is why the present moment should be understood not simply as the decline of Pax Americana, but as the rebirth of the United States through and after the death of that order.

Spengler tells you why the old universalist phase was always going to break down. Keynes tells you how the monetary architecture of American primacy contained the seeds of debt, hollowed-out industry, and populist revolt. The American jeremiad explains why that revolt takes the form not of nihilistic collapse but of a moral lawsuit demanding restoration. And Trump, for all his personal disorder, becomes the forcing function through which this latent logic enters public life. He is not the whole of the rebirth, but he is the figure under whom it begins, and through whom the country has made its choice.

That is the real meaning of the American 250th anniversary. Not a museum anniversary, and not a memorial service for Pax Americana, but the declaration that the United States has chosen national renewal over imperial drift. The old order is ending because it had to end. Spengler would have expected that. What he did not fully reckon with was the American capacity to turn breakdown into mandate, to treat crisis as judgment and judgment as command. That is what the American jeremiad has always done, and under Trump it has moved from rhetoric to statecraft.

The United States is no longer wondering whether to leave the exhausted universalism of the postwar era behind. It is doing so. It is reordering around sovereignty, industry, borders, energy, and technological primacy. The rebirth has begun. We have not chosen this time, but America has chosen how to meet it.

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May Market Insights: Mastery and the Terror Premium

Mastery of energy, again

Winston Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty, tied Britain’s fate to Persian oil. United States President Donald Trump’s war in Iran, centred on Operation Epic Fury, could do the same for the West by removing Iran’s nuclear shadow, resetting oil toward US$60, and finally unlocking a modern peace dividend.

“Mastery itself was the prize of the venture.” Winston Churchill’s 1912–13 case for converting the Royal Navy from coal to oil—enshrined in historian Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power captured the brutal clarity of a great power energy strategy: accept dependence to command the seas. That wager framed the last century. In 2026, as Epic Fury grinds through the Gulf and Brent trades above US$100, the question is no longer whether oil confers mastery, but who holds it: a revolutionary theocracy astride the Strait of Hormuz, or a West intent on stripping the terror and nuclear risk now priced into every barrel out of the energy system—finally collecting a long‑deferred peace dividend.

Churchill’s shift bound Britain’s prosperity to distant wells and narrow waterways, welding energy supply to national survival. He understood that control of energy was not an adjunct to power, it was the metric. In April 2026, with Hormuz contested and Iranian missiles demonstrating reach beyond the Middle East, the same dilemma confronts policymakers and markets. Does the West still want that prize, and what is it prepared to stake to reclaim it from a regime that has spent half a century turning oil, terror, and nuclear brinkmanship into interchangeable tools of coercion? Assume Trump’s campaign does what it is now on course to do: not merely reopen a chokepoint, but neutralize a nascent tactical nuclear threat which, left intact, would hardwire a doomsday premium into global energy prices for a generation.

Iran’s war with the West has done what decades of shocks, embargoes, and “maximum pressure” could not: it has made the hidden tax on energy legible even on a Bloomberg screen. Strip out the terror and nuclear‑risk premiums in a post‑Trump‑Iran settlement, and Brent does not belong north of US$100; it sits much closer to the US$60 level implied by underlying supply and demand and pre‑war bank research. The gap between where oil trades in a world held hostage by a nuclear‑ambitious theocracy at Hormuz and where it would trade if flows were secure and de‑weaponized is more than a volatility surface. It is the unclaimed peace dividend of globalization, the energy market analogue of the windfall that followed the end of the Cold War, when the removal of an existential nuclear standoff released capital, confidence, and capacity back into the real economy.

The choice now facing the West is whether to lock in that outcome. Ending the Cold War removed the Sword of Damocles that had hung over every investment decision for half a century; a successful conclusion to Iran’s nuclear extortion would do something similar for the 21st‑century economy, collapsing a structural risk premium that has quietly taxed households, corporates, and sovereigns alike. The question, as Churchill would have recognized, is whether the West is prepared not just to win on the battlefield but to consolidate that victory into a new era of energy mastery, and to treat the potential verified removal of Iran’s enriched stockpile and fuel‑cycle capabilities as a security gain on the scale of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or the dissolution of the Soviet arsenal.

For Europe, the stakes are not abstract. Iranian missiles and drones have already shown that European Union territory and NATO logistics hubs sit uncomfortably close to the new strike envelope, shattering the illusion that Gulf risk could be quarantined to energy prices alone. The deeper reckoning is with Europe’s own energy strategy. The choice by many Western governments to anchor industrial policy primarily on climate targets while neglecting cheap and secure supply—is now coming home to roost. Prosperity in an artificial intelligence (AI)‑driven economy rests on abundant, reliable energy rather than on cheap consumer imports, echoing Churchill’s insight that mastery of energy is mastery of power. That logic points north as well as east: Canada with its hydrocarbons, hydropower, and critical minerals—looks less like a peripheral supplier and more like a potential resource superpower if it can cut through regulatory thickets and build the infrastructure to deliver secure barrels, electrons, and metals to allied markets.

U.S. hard power, the security backstop European, Canadian, and the United Kingdom economies long treated as a law of nature, now looks more contingent, more politically conditional, and more thinly spread across theatres. One could easily imagine Washington reverting to a post‑First World War stance, turning inward to rebuild its real economy, and no longer willing or able to offer security as a global public good. A successful Trump‑led settlement that removes both the nuclear overhang and the Hormuz chokepoint as instruments of coercion would not only stabilize Atlantic world energy supply but also underwrite a more credible NATO deterrent at lower long‑run cost—replacing the ersatz “peace dividend” of underfunded defence with a genuine one built on reduced threat rather than wishful budgeting.

For investors, a decisive outcome in Iran would not just redraw maps in the Gulf; it would refashion term premia. As the nuclear and terror discounts bleed out of the curve, gilt yields and U.S. Treasuries alike would begin to reflect lower expected inflation and slimmer risk premia rather than recurring energy shocks. Credit spreads-particularly for energy‑intensive sectors and fragile sovereigns—would compress as balance of payments and default risks ease. Equity markets would reprice in turn: structurally lower input costs and a thinner geopolitical risk layer would lift margins in manufacturing, transport, and consumer names, even as oil majors and defence stocks surrender some of their crisis rent. For the Square Mile and Wall Street, the real prize is not another trade on US$120 Brent; it is the re‑rating that comes when a structural doomsday premium is finally taken out of the system and the peace dividend—deferred since the end of the Cold War and repeatedly eroded by Iran—at last starts to be paid in cash flows rather than communiqués.

Churchill’s ghost at Hormuz

On the first day of April 2026, as Brent traded just above US$100, the world was relearning what Churchill meant when he called mastery the prize. As first lord of the Admiralty, he forced the Royal Navy off domestic coal and onto Persian oil, then secured that lifeblood by buying control of Anglo‑Persian Oil. He knew the bargain: oil conferred speed and reach, but at the price of dependence on distant fields and fragile sea lanes. Hence his warning to Parliament in 1913 that “on no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent” and his insistence that safety and certainty in oil lay “in variety, and in variety alone.”

That decision created the modern energy system and placed Iran at its centre. Four decades later, as prime minister, Churchill confronted the second act of his own gamble when Iran’s prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Anglo‑Iranian Oil Company’s assets. The 1953 coup that restored the Shah was less a morality play than a confirmation that control over Iranian oil would be contested by empires, nationalists, and, eventually, revolutionaries. Churchill’s instinct to secure supply at the source and to dominate the sea lanes that connected it to Britain established a strategic architecture with a simple premise: mastery of energy flows was indistinguishable from mastery of global power.

The twist came in 1979, when that architecture was seized by those it had previously constrained. The Iranian Revolution toppled the Shah and installed Ayatollah Khomeini’s theocracy—a regime that viewed the U.S. as the “Great Satan,” embraced terrorism as statecraft, and sat astride the Strait of Hormuz. Oil workers struck, production collapsed, and prices more than doubled. The world discovered that the geographic fulcrum Churchill had chosen could just as easily be pulled by a revolutionary fist. From that moment, the markets began to price an Iran terror premium. It was distinct from OPEC’s cartel pricing power or conventional war risk. It recognized that a state sponsor of terrorism—with a web of proxies and control over the narrow channel through which roughly a fifth of seaborne oil must pass—would periodically weaponize that position. Each tanker attack in the 1980s “Tanker War,” each Hezbollah bombing, each missile launched at a Gulf facility added a sliver to that premium. Over time, slivers hardened into a slab.

Churchill’s maxim was inverted. Variety still existed geologically, with new barrels from the North Sea, Alaska, and deepwater, but strategically the system was again anchored on a single actor most willing to turn energy into a cudgel. Where Churchill had sought safety through variety, the world lived with uncertainty concentrated in one revolutionary capital. And where he had seen mastery as the prize of bold, deliberate ventures, mastery of energy risk quietly migrated to a regime that treated terror as an operating model.

How terror became a line item

The terror premium is no longer an academic calculation; it is a visible spread. In calmer phases of the cycle, geopolitical risk barely nudges price forecasts. In crisis, as in early 2026, the gap between pre‑war expectations for oil and the levels seen when Hormuz is threatened yawns wider, and futures curves kink as traders try to price the possibility of disruption. Even if part of that is fear and temporality, the underlying message is obvious. There is a structural surcharge on every barrel to account for the probability that Tehran or one of its proxies will, at some point, take terrorist action.

That surcharge has a history. The 1973–74 oil embargo revealed how quickly geopolitics could quadruple prices, but Iran was then still an ally. The true discontinuity came with the 1979 revolution and the Iran‑Iraq War. The Tanker War saw mines in the Gulf, neutral shipping attacked, and U.S. naval forces drawn in to reflag and escort tankers. Washington’s 1984 decision to designate Iran a state sponsor of terrorism, off the back of Hezbollah’s bombing of U.S. Marines in Beirut, made explicit what markets had intuited: one of the central suppliers to the system was also its most committed saboteur.

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Highlights from the 2026 Spring Economic Update

On April 28, 2026, Finance and National Revenue Minister François-Philippe Champagne released the 2026
Spring Economic Update (the Update). This was the first spring economic update after the federal budget was
moved to the fall in 2025. In the absence of a federal budget earlier this year and with the recent shift to a
majority government, Canadians have been awaiting clear direction on the federal government’s policy
focus and anticipated initiatives. Overall, the Update introduces relatively little that had not been previously
announced, while showing an improved fiscal outlook, with the projected deficit declining despite $37.5 billion
in net new spending.

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April Market Insights: Bretton Woods 2.0, the New Great Game, and Trump

U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term is not just another burst of tariff theatre; it is the opening move in a new great game over energy, artificial intelligence (AI), and money. By neutralizing Iran and Venezuela, squeezing Cuba, binding Canada, and courting Russia, Washington is trying to re-anchor oil in U.S. dollars and push BRICS’ [1] monetary ambitions to the margins. Layered on top are digital rails—dollar-backed stablecoins, tokenized Treasuries, gold, and even a strategic bitcoin reserve—designed to harden, not retire, King Dollar. If it works, Bretton Woods 2.0 will arrive not as a conference, but as the unannounced sequel to a crisis-ridden decade, with the U.S. once again writing the rules.

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March Market Insights: There is no Bronze Medal

“There’s only two cultures that are going to win in the next year. It’s going to be us or China.” The subtext of Palantir CEO Alex Karp’s widely cited speech from late 2025 sounds like tech‑bro theatre until you reflect on it. In artificial intelligence, there is no bronze medal. There will be a hegemon and a runner‑up. Everyone else will be a client.

Markets are not pricing that reality. Investors still treat the AI build-out as marginal cloud spend or another overhyped software cycle. They debate whether Big Tech is “exhausting its available capital” or whether capex “must mean revert,” as if infrastructure were optional and competition courteous. They are using valuation models from the wrong century for the wrong game.

AI is not an app store. It is a weapon system—and the operating system of the next industrial era. The capital going into it is not a bubble. It is rearmament.

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