November Market Insights MONEY FOR NOTHING: The Illusion of Easy Wealth in Today’s Economy

November Market Insights MONEY FOR NOTHING: The Illusion of Easy Wealth in Today’s Economy

MONEY FOR NOTHING:
The Illusion of Easy Wealth in Today’s Economy

 

There are moments in life that leave a lasting impression. For me, two significant memories from the 1985 Live Aid concert stand out: Queen’s iconic performance and Dire Straits, featuring Sting, introducing the world to their classic song Money for Nothing. Since the late 1980s,following Japan’s economic miracle, the idea of creating “money for nothing” has become a go-to strategy for many involved in crafting fiscal policy.However, this tactic ultimately solves nothing. Should investors be concerned?

 

My investing philosophy is straightforward: central bankers look to the past, the consensus focuses on the present, but investors must look five to six quarters into the future. Ultimately, interest rates and global liquidity will dictate how investors should position their portfolios. With global debt levels not seen since the Napoleonic Wars and monetary policies constraining the private sector, we are entering a new era where policymakers may once again embrace the notion of “money for nothing.”

Just as a worn-out record player needle skips and scratches across a vinyl disc played too many times,policymakers repeated fiscal irresponsibility will eventually cause the credit market to revolt, distorting the economic melody and potentially bringing the financial symphony to a discordant halt. Investors should be prepared. In 2025, a fiscal crisis awaits if policymakers do not address the elephant in the room—unsustainable fiscal spending. Yes, a Liz Truss moment [1] is a significant tail risk, and it’s folly for investors and policymakers to assume otherwise.

The Mirage of Monetary Magic

Our current economy, marked by extreme fiscal deficits,resembles a wartime economy. As we approach the upcoming U.S. presidential election, investors anticipate a switch back to a peacetime economy. Some believe this transition can be eased by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s “easy money” policies, speaking with a certainty that suggests they’re reading from an economic prophecy. Yet, like promises of “money for nothing” in that iconic Dire Straits song, their predictions dance around the truth—glamorous, catchy, but ultimately hollow.

In his recent address, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell painted an economic picture that, while superficially impressive, fails under scrutiny. Powell’s portrayal suggests a perfect balance: a labour market soft landing, inflation tamed to 2.2 per cent, and the dual mandate fulfilled. However, this narrative glosses over the underlying fragilities and distortions in the economic fabric. It’s as if he’s singing a sweet tune,while the band plays on, oblivious to the cracks forming beneath the stage.

The 0.5 percentage point cut in the federal funds rate (FFR), along with hints of future reductions, is presented as a calculated move. However,it raises questions about the Federal Reserve’s foresight and timing. The central bank’s playbook suggests the FFR should match the natural rate (r*), currently estimated at 2.75 per cent. This implies the Federal Reserve may still be too tight, potentially stifling economic growth. It feels like a high-stakes game of musical chairs, and when the music stops, will anyone be left standing?

Notably absent from Powell’s address was any meaningful discussion of the alarming fiscal situation.The projected 25 per cent growth in the fiscal deficit for 2024 and a debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio of 125 per cent evoke wartime economics. This level of spending is unsustainable and will likely need addressing post-election, one way or another. I differ from the consensus—the level of fiscal irresponsibility will be dealt with, if not by the new administration, then by credit markets creating a Liz Truss moment in the U.S. The U.K.’s recent austerity budget serves as a canary in the coal mine, warning of potential credit market revolts if fiscal issues remain unaddressed. It’s a financial reality check that hits harder than a guitar riff!

The Japan Paradox and China’s
Monetary Mirage

Japan’s economic journey over the last few decades starkly contrasts the claims of monetary policy enthusiasts. Despite one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios globally and near-zero interest rates for decades,Japan has struggled with low inflation and sluggish growth. This paradox challenges the conventional wisdom that loose monetary policy is a cure-all for economic ills—it’s like trying to find a hit song in a sea of karaoke flops!

Recent developments in China further underscore the limitations of monetary policy. Despite launching bold stimulus packages and lowering interest rates,China grapples with deflationary pressures and economic challenges. This highlights that monetary policy alone cannot generate sustained economic growth amid structural issues. It’s a reminder that you can’t just throw money at a problem and expect it to miraculously transform into something spectacular.

The Four Horsemen of Deflation

While many focus on the potential of monetary policy, they overlook what we call “the four horsemen of deflation,” which are excess capacity, extreme debt levels, demographics, and innovation. These forces form solid foundations beneath our economic landscape—foundations that monetary policy alone cannot overcome.

Current economic stability is largely propped up by unsustainable fiscal spending. The private sector shows signs of strain, obscured by government expenditure levels typical of national emergencies. As fiscal spending inevitably contracts post-election, the true state of the private sector and the broader economy will come to light. The potential for a delayed but significant economic downturn in late 2025 remains a serious concern. It’s like waiting for the encore at a concert—exciting, because you know a big drop is coming!

The Imperative of Structural Reforms

The key lesson from Japan and China’s experiences is the necessity of comprehensive structural reforms alongside monetary policy. These may include addressing bad debts, reforming labour markets,improving corporate governance, and enhancing productivity and innovation. Monetary policy, while important, is no substitute for these crucial reforms.

The election of Shigeru Ishiba as Japan’s new Prime Minister marks a significant shift away from the monetary-focused policies of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Abenomics.” Ishiba’s willingness to tackle structural reforms reflects a recognition that “easy money” alone is insufficient.His approach could provide new insights into managing a high-debt, lowinflation economy beyond the limitations of monetary policy. It’s like trading your old guitar for a shiny new model—time to strum a different tune!

Building on Solid Ground

As we transition from a wartime-like economy to a peacetime economy, it’s crucial to dismantle the castles in the air built by monetary policy enthusiasts. We must rebuild our understanding on the solid ground of historical evidence and economic reality. Loose monetary policy does not guarantee economic prosperity or high inflation.Historical evidence suggests a more intricate relationship between monetary policy, debt, economic growth, and inflation.

Moving forward, policymakers must resist the temptation to be swayed by the grand but unsupported promises of monetary magic. Instead, they should focus on crafting nuanced policies that account for this complexity. The key to managing our economic challenges lies in a combination of factors: gradual fiscal consolidation, maintaining central bank independence and credibility, implementing structural reforms,and leveraging global economic forces. Negative real interest rates and increased money supply can be tools in this process, but they are not all-encompassing solutions. After all, just like the song suggests, real success requires effort—not just dreams of “money for nothing.”

Investment Implications

While the Federal Reserve dwells in history and Wall Street clings to the present, true market visionaries peer 18 months into the future, recognizing that the ebb and flow of global liquidity—not corporate spreadsheets—dictates the market’s pulse. As we enter an era of global reflation, risk assets may benefit. The S&P 500 could reach 6,000 by year-end, with a potential for 7,000 by late 2025 or early 2026 if conditions align favourably.

Gold and bitcoin look attractive in this environment, while artificial intelligence (AI) developments could boost the U.S. economy. However, Saudi Arabia’s defence of market share poses a headwind for oil prices. China’s recent stimulus measures, while not addressing fundamental issues, may offer tactical
opportunities for investors.

The big question remains: when will investors realize that growth in the private sector is weak and a soft landing is not a certainty? With inflation at target and the labour market balanced, the FFR should be at the natural rate of 2.75 per cent right now. With 18-month lags in monetary policy and an era of austerity before us, a hard landing is still possible, with interest rates below two per cent in 2026.

Moreover, when will investors recognize that the “transmission mechanism” for FFR cuts is broken,and that interest rate cuts are not a magic bullet capable of fixing underlying economic issues? Money for nothing, fixes nothing, history is crystal clear on that.

In conclusion, as we navigate these complex economic waters, we must remain vigilant against both inflationary and deflationary risks, always grounding our policies and expectations in empirical evidence rather than the illusion of easy money. The transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy will likely bring significant challenges, and the true test of our economic resilience may not be apparent until late 2025. Investors and policymakers alike would do well to look beyond the current economic mirage and prepare for the realities of a post-stimulus world.

Just remember, in the end, there’s no such thing as “money for nothing” when building a sustainable economy—it’s all about hard work and the right tune.

[1] In 2022, U.K. Prime Minister Liz Truss announced a series of underfunded tax cuts that triggered a drastic drop in the British Pound, skyrocketing government borrowing costs, and a revolt in credit markets, resulting in her resignation after 45 days in office.

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May Market Insights: Mastery and the Terror Premium

Mastery of energy, again

Winston Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty, tied Britain’s fate to Persian oil. United States President Donald Trump’s war in Iran, centred on Operation Epic Fury, could do the same for the West by removing Iran’s nuclear shadow, resetting oil toward US$60, and finally unlocking a modern peace dividend.

“Mastery itself was the prize of the venture.” Winston Churchill’s 1912–13 case for converting the Royal Navy from coal to oil—enshrined in historian Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power captured the brutal clarity of a great power energy strategy: accept dependence to command the seas. That wager framed the last century. In 2026, as Epic Fury grinds through the Gulf and Brent trades above US$100, the question is no longer whether oil confers mastery, but who holds it: a revolutionary theocracy astride the Strait of Hormuz, or a West intent on stripping the terror and nuclear risk now priced into every barrel out of the energy system—finally collecting a long‑deferred peace dividend.

Churchill’s shift bound Britain’s prosperity to distant wells and narrow waterways, welding energy supply to national survival. He understood that control of energy was not an adjunct to power, it was the metric. In April 2026, with Hormuz contested and Iranian missiles demonstrating reach beyond the Middle East, the same dilemma confronts policymakers and markets. Does the West still want that prize, and what is it prepared to stake to reclaim it from a regime that has spent half a century turning oil, terror, and nuclear brinkmanship into interchangeable tools of coercion? Assume Trump’s campaign does what it is now on course to do: not merely reopen a chokepoint, but neutralize a nascent tactical nuclear threat which, left intact, would hardwire a doomsday premium into global energy prices for a generation.

Iran’s war with the West has done what decades of shocks, embargoes, and “maximum pressure” could not: it has made the hidden tax on energy legible even on a Bloomberg screen. Strip out the terror and nuclear‑risk premiums in a post‑Trump‑Iran settlement, and Brent does not belong north of US$100; it sits much closer to the US$60 level implied by underlying supply and demand and pre‑war bank research. The gap between where oil trades in a world held hostage by a nuclear‑ambitious theocracy at Hormuz and where it would trade if flows were secure and de‑weaponized is more than a volatility surface. It is the unclaimed peace dividend of globalization, the energy market analogue of the windfall that followed the end of the Cold War, when the removal of an existential nuclear standoff released capital, confidence, and capacity back into the real economy.

The choice now facing the West is whether to lock in that outcome. Ending the Cold War removed the Sword of Damocles that had hung over every investment decision for half a century; a successful conclusion to Iran’s nuclear extortion would do something similar for the 21st‑century economy, collapsing a structural risk premium that has quietly taxed households, corporates, and sovereigns alike. The question, as Churchill would have recognized, is whether the West is prepared not just to win on the battlefield but to consolidate that victory into a new era of energy mastery, and to treat the potential verified removal of Iran’s enriched stockpile and fuel‑cycle capabilities as a security gain on the scale of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or the dissolution of the Soviet arsenal.

For Europe, the stakes are not abstract. Iranian missiles and drones have already shown that European Union territory and NATO logistics hubs sit uncomfortably close to the new strike envelope, shattering the illusion that Gulf risk could be quarantined to energy prices alone. The deeper reckoning is with Europe’s own energy strategy. The choice by many Western governments to anchor industrial policy primarily on climate targets while neglecting cheap and secure supply—is now coming home to roost. Prosperity in an artificial intelligence (AI)‑driven economy rests on abundant, reliable energy rather than on cheap consumer imports, echoing Churchill’s insight that mastery of energy is mastery of power. That logic points north as well as east: Canada with its hydrocarbons, hydropower, and critical minerals—looks less like a peripheral supplier and more like a potential resource superpower if it can cut through regulatory thickets and build the infrastructure to deliver secure barrels, electrons, and metals to allied markets.

U.S. hard power, the security backstop European, Canadian, and the United Kingdom economies long treated as a law of nature, now looks more contingent, more politically conditional, and more thinly spread across theatres. One could easily imagine Washington reverting to a post‑First World War stance, turning inward to rebuild its real economy, and no longer willing or able to offer security as a global public good. A successful Trump‑led settlement that removes both the nuclear overhang and the Hormuz chokepoint as instruments of coercion would not only stabilize Atlantic world energy supply but also underwrite a more credible NATO deterrent at lower long‑run cost—replacing the ersatz “peace dividend” of underfunded defence with a genuine one built on reduced threat rather than wishful budgeting.

For investors, a decisive outcome in Iran would not just redraw maps in the Gulf; it would refashion term premia. As the nuclear and terror discounts bleed out of the curve, gilt yields and U.S. Treasuries alike would begin to reflect lower expected inflation and slimmer risk premia rather than recurring energy shocks. Credit spreads-particularly for energy‑intensive sectors and fragile sovereigns—would compress as balance of payments and default risks ease. Equity markets would reprice in turn: structurally lower input costs and a thinner geopolitical risk layer would lift margins in manufacturing, transport, and consumer names, even as oil majors and defence stocks surrender some of their crisis rent. For the Square Mile and Wall Street, the real prize is not another trade on US$120 Brent; it is the re‑rating that comes when a structural doomsday premium is finally taken out of the system and the peace dividend—deferred since the end of the Cold War and repeatedly eroded by Iran—at last starts to be paid in cash flows rather than communiqués.

Churchill’s ghost at Hormuz

On the first day of April 2026, as Brent traded just above US$100, the world was relearning what Churchill meant when he called mastery the prize. As first lord of the Admiralty, he forced the Royal Navy off domestic coal and onto Persian oil, then secured that lifeblood by buying control of Anglo‑Persian Oil. He knew the bargain: oil conferred speed and reach, but at the price of dependence on distant fields and fragile sea lanes. Hence his warning to Parliament in 1913 that “on no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent” and his insistence that safety and certainty in oil lay “in variety, and in variety alone.”

That decision created the modern energy system and placed Iran at its centre. Four decades later, as prime minister, Churchill confronted the second act of his own gamble when Iran’s prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Anglo‑Iranian Oil Company’s assets. The 1953 coup that restored the Shah was less a morality play than a confirmation that control over Iranian oil would be contested by empires, nationalists, and, eventually, revolutionaries. Churchill’s instinct to secure supply at the source and to dominate the sea lanes that connected it to Britain established a strategic architecture with a simple premise: mastery of energy flows was indistinguishable from mastery of global power.

The twist came in 1979, when that architecture was seized by those it had previously constrained. The Iranian Revolution toppled the Shah and installed Ayatollah Khomeini’s theocracy—a regime that viewed the U.S. as the “Great Satan,” embraced terrorism as statecraft, and sat astride the Strait of Hormuz. Oil workers struck, production collapsed, and prices more than doubled. The world discovered that the geographic fulcrum Churchill had chosen could just as easily be pulled by a revolutionary fist. From that moment, the markets began to price an Iran terror premium. It was distinct from OPEC’s cartel pricing power or conventional war risk. It recognized that a state sponsor of terrorism—with a web of proxies and control over the narrow channel through which roughly a fifth of seaborne oil must pass—would periodically weaponize that position. Each tanker attack in the 1980s “Tanker War,” each Hezbollah bombing, each missile launched at a Gulf facility added a sliver to that premium. Over time, slivers hardened into a slab.

Churchill’s maxim was inverted. Variety still existed geologically, with new barrels from the North Sea, Alaska, and deepwater, but strategically the system was again anchored on a single actor most willing to turn energy into a cudgel. Where Churchill had sought safety through variety, the world lived with uncertainty concentrated in one revolutionary capital. And where he had seen mastery as the prize of bold, deliberate ventures, mastery of energy risk quietly migrated to a regime that treated terror as an operating model.

How terror became a line item

The terror premium is no longer an academic calculation; it is a visible spread. In calmer phases of the cycle, geopolitical risk barely nudges price forecasts. In crisis, as in early 2026, the gap between pre‑war expectations for oil and the levels seen when Hormuz is threatened yawns wider, and futures curves kink as traders try to price the possibility of disruption. Even if part of that is fear and temporality, the underlying message is obvious. There is a structural surcharge on every barrel to account for the probability that Tehran or one of its proxies will, at some point, take terrorist action.

That surcharge has a history. The 1973–74 oil embargo revealed how quickly geopolitics could quadruple prices, but Iran was then still an ally. The true discontinuity came with the 1979 revolution and the Iran‑Iraq War. The Tanker War saw mines in the Gulf, neutral shipping attacked, and U.S. naval forces drawn in to reflag and escort tankers. Washington’s 1984 decision to designate Iran a state sponsor of terrorism, off the back of Hezbollah’s bombing of U.S. Marines in Beirut, made explicit what markets had intuited: one of the central suppliers to the system was also its most committed saboteur.

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Highlights from the 2026 Spring Economic Update

On April 28, 2026, Finance and National Revenue Minister François-Philippe Champagne released the 2026
Spring Economic Update (the Update). This was the first spring economic update after the federal budget was
moved to the fall in 2025. In the absence of a federal budget earlier this year and with the recent shift to a
majority government, Canadians have been awaiting clear direction on the federal government’s policy
focus and anticipated initiatives. Overall, the Update introduces relatively little that had not been previously
announced, while showing an improved fiscal outlook, with the projected deficit declining despite $37.5 billion
in net new spending.

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April Market Insights: Bretton Woods 2.0, the New Great Game, and Trump

U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term is not just another burst of tariff theatre; it is the opening move in a new great game over energy, artificial intelligence (AI), and money. By neutralizing Iran and Venezuela, squeezing Cuba, binding Canada, and courting Russia, Washington is trying to re-anchor oil in U.S. dollars and push BRICS’ [1] monetary ambitions to the margins. Layered on top are digital rails—dollar-backed stablecoins, tokenized Treasuries, gold, and even a strategic bitcoin reserve—designed to harden, not retire, King Dollar. If it works, Bretton Woods 2.0 will arrive not as a conference, but as the unannounced sequel to a crisis-ridden decade, with the U.S. once again writing the rules.

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March Market Insights: There is no Bronze Medal

“There’s only two cultures that are going to win in the next year. It’s going to be us or China.” The subtext of Palantir CEO Alex Karp’s widely cited speech from late 2025 sounds like tech‑bro theatre until you reflect on it. In artificial intelligence, there is no bronze medal. There will be a hegemon and a runner‑up. Everyone else will be a client.

Markets are not pricing that reality. Investors still treat the AI build-out as marginal cloud spend or another overhyped software cycle. They debate whether Big Tech is “exhausting its available capital” or whether capex “must mean revert,” as if infrastructure were optional and competition courteous. They are using valuation models from the wrong century for the wrong game.

AI is not an app store. It is a weapon system—and the operating system of the next industrial era. The capital going into it is not a bubble. It is rearmament.

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